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INTRODUCTION
When President Dilma rousseff first took of-fice in 2010, Brazil’s future looked excep-
tionally bright. The country had benefited from 
asia’s enormous appetite for its commodities for 
nearly a decade. With this economic tailwind, Bra-
zil quickly recovered from the global financial cri-
sis in 2008, and it became an attractive destination 
for foreign capital. Global powers—particularly 
the United states—acknowledged Brazil as an im-
portant country whose voice deserved to be heard. 
regionally, argentina’s decline and Mexico’s focus 
on North america opened up room for Brazil to 
secure leadership in south america through new 
regional institutions such as the Union of south 
american Nations (UNasUr) and the Com-
munity of latin american and Caribbean states 
(CelaC). Brazil was recognized as a global leader 
in poverty reduction through its social programs 
such as Bolsa Família and witnessed a substantial 
growth in the middle class during the luis inacio da 
silva (lula da silva) administrations (2003-2010). 
in the international system, Brazil sought prerog-
atives commensurate to major power status, cam-
paigning for a permanent seat at the U.N. security 
Council and joining the G-20 group of economy 
and Finance Ministers created during the global 
financial crisis. Given these circumstances, it is not 
surprising that lula da silva was one of the most 
popular outgoing presidents in Brazil’s history, and 
that Dilma rousseff took leadership of a country 
widely thought of as a rising global power.
as Brazil nears the end of a decade of economic 
and political exuberance in latin america, ques-
tions about its trajectory arise. The ability for Bra-
zilian commodity exporters to meet demand for 
their products is constrained by poor export in-
frastructure. its currency is also significantly over-
valued, undercutting the competitiveness of its 
non-commodity-based export sectors. Globally, 
the two most significant global trade negotiations 
in a decade, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the 
Trans-atlantic Trade and investment Partnership, 
are transpiring without its participation. Mercosur 
once showcased Brazil’s leadership in robust re-
gional integration initiatives but now ties it to two 
of the most troubled economies in south america 
—argentina and Venezuela. Domestically, polit-
ical support for President rousseff has softened. 
There are continuing concerns in the middle class 
over its economic prospects, and some of its ire has 
focused on Brazil’s major international prestige 
projects, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 sum-
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mer Olympics. social protests were widespread in 
2013, including some that ended in violence. 
Brazil stands at a crossroads in its road to major 
power status. it can either continue its ascent, or 
can remain a middle power, albeit a critical one, 
within the existing international status quo. a ma-
jor power is characterized by more than size, pop-
ulation, and economic achievement. it is distin-
guished by its intentions regarding its role in the 
international system. To assess a rising power, we 
have to examine the degree to which a state is able 
to successfully participate in shaping the rules and 
forming the regimes that govern the international 
order.1 
Brazil has sought major power status to facilitate 
its own economic development and to maximize 
its autonomy in the international system. it has his-
torically valued the norms of sovereignty, non-in-
tervention, and peaceful resolution of disputes in 
international relations. so while Brazil would like 
to be a rule shaper rather than a rule taker in the 
international system, the rules it would find ac-
ceptable tread lightly on the sovereignty of states.2
This paper argues that Brazil’s aspirations to ma-
jor power status have been a constant, but that its 
attempts to rise have fallen short historically due 
to the mismatch between its capabilities and the 
available opportunities to emerge as a great power. 
in particular, Brazil has been attempting to solve 
a difficult puzzle: how to emerge as a major pow-
er without resorting to the traditional use of hard 
military and economic power to compel others to 
accept its rise. 
in comparison to other rising powers such as in-
dia and China, Brazil’s recent regional security 
environment is enviably peaceful, at least at the 
interstate level. This has diminished Brazil’s inter-
est in developing the kinds of military capabilities 
characteristic of other rising powers. its history as 
a developing country has limited its willingness to 
accept the costs of using economic power through 
sanctions or aid to induce other states to change 
their behavior. additionally, there is a normative 
dimension in Brazilian foreign policy that resists 
the employment of hard power in international 
affairs. 
Brazil’s path also differs from other rising powers 
because of the great emphasis it places on cooper-
ation with others. This cooperation is designed to 
compensate for the enduring obstacles to Brazil’s 
rise, which are: a shortfall of hard power, partic-
ularly military power; unwillingness to commit 
its economic power to provide incentives and side 
payments so that other powers might follow its 
lead; opposition within Brazil’s own region to its 
rise to major power status; and the inability of soft 
power, no matter how skillfully deployed, to make 
and maintain the international order. Brazilians 
are not reconciled to the traditional demands and 
costs of major power status, both in its military 
and economic dimensions, and they seek a differ-
ent path.
1  Jeffrey W. legro, Rethinking the World: Major Power Strategies and the International Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). For a discus-
sion of rule shaping and the international order, see Waheguru Pal singh sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones, “a Hesitant rule shaper?,” in 
Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order, ed. Waheguru Pal singh sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones (Washington 
DC: Brookings institution Press, 2013), 3–22. 
2  Gabriel Cepaluni and Tullo Vigevani, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2012). 
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Brazil’s path to major power status has also been 
erratic. at different times, it has tried to rise by 
accepting the status quo as an ally of the United 
states in World War i and World War ii; joining 
a block of developing countries critical of the su-
perpowers beginning in the 1960s; and working 
jointly with the BriCs, a club of rising powers, 
to shape the rules governing the present interna-
tional order. each stance Brazil takes is an attempt 
to advantageously position itself with respect to 
emerging opportunities and new partners, but the 
positions taken are not necessarily compatible with 
each other. Moreover, Brazil’s efforts to advance 
through partnerships with other states is hobbled 
by a historical reluctance to pool its sovereignty. in 
addition, turbulent domestic politics or major eco-
nomic crises have occasionally undermined Brazil’s 
credibility and capabilities, interrupting its rise.
This paper explains Brazil’s attempts to rise in the 
international system over time. First, it examines 
the challenges faced by all rising powers as they 
attempt to improve their position in the interna-
tional system. it then turns to Brazil’s attempts to 
rise during the 20th century, illustrating how the 
mismatch between capabilities and opportunities 
impeded attempts to emerge as a major power. The 
paper then focuses on Brazil’s most recent attempt 
to rise during the first two decades of the 21st cen-
tury. Changes in the international system today 
provide Brazil with an unprecedented opportuni-
ty to participate in shaping the global order. This 
section examines how Brazil uses its capabilities, 
mostly diplomatic and soft power, across three 
domains: security, economics, and the global com-
mons. Brazil’s successes and failures across these 
domains highlight the ways in which its present 
capabilities limit its rise. The paper concludes with 
implications for Brazilian and U.s. policymakers.
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rising Powers: inTenTions, 
CaPabiliTies, and 
oPPorTuniTies
There is a rich international relations literature on rising powers that looks beyond size and 
focuses on countries’ intentions and the implica-
tions of their rise for other states in the interna-
tional system. Originally, this literature was partic-
ularly concerned with power transitions between 
rising and major powers. it was grounded in the 
observation that power transitions are a period of 
higher risk for international conflict, particular-
ly when the rising power is dissatisfied with the 
existing norms and structure of the international 
system.3 Today, some scholars argue that peaceful 
transitions are more likely since major system-
ic wars are improbable in the nuclear era. at the 
same time, globalization and growing regional 
interdependence engender a convergence of in-
terests among rising and traditional powers that 
reduces the probability of conflict among them. 
although much scholarly attention has focused on 
China, other powers such as india and Brazil are 
also knocking at the door of major power status, 
driving new interest in this debate.4
Discussion on the effect of rising powers on the in-
ternational order has become more nuanced. sid-
hu, Mehta and Jones argue for a standard of ‘rule 
shaping’ rather than ‘rule making’ to evaluate a ris-
ing powers’ effect.5  They observe that historically, 
very few powers have been able to make the rules 
governing the international order by themselves. 
Using a ‘rule making’ standard would exclude 
from study most cases of rising powers. in addi-
tion, scholars increasingly distinguish between the 
types of power available to states to shape the sys-
tem. Power is understood here using robert Dahl’s 
classic 1957 definition of the ability of one state to 
cause another to perform an action they otherwise 
would not have undertaken. This paper relies on 
Joseph Nye’s distinction between hard power (the 
power to compel others) and soft power (the pow-
er to attract others towards your preferred out-
come). Military power is often categorized as hard 
power while economic power can be viewed more 
ambiguously, either as hard power when it is used 
to impose sanctions or to buy off other states, or 
as soft power when a country with a successful 
economic model is able to attract others desiring a 
similar outcome to its cause. soft power includes a 
range of cultural, economic, political, and ideolog-
ical dimensions of a state that make it an attractive 
model for other states. implicit in this is a recog-
nition that power is not just about material capa-
bilities, but is also about the norms and values to 
which states appeal to externally legitimize their 
behavior in the international system.6 
identifying an emerging power and distinguishing 
it from a merely large country requires an ex ante 
indicator of its intentional pursuit of a higher po-
sition in the international system. For the purposes 
3  Jacek Kugler, Douglas lemke, and ronald l. Tammen, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatam House/Seven Bridges 
Press, 2000).
4  steve Chan, “is There a Power Transition between the U.s. and China? The Different Faces of National Power,” Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (October 
2005): 687–701, doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.5.687; G. John ikenberry, “Future of the liberal World Order: internationalism after america,” Foreign 
Affairs 90 (2011): 23; Jeffrey W. legro, “What China Will Want: The Future intentions of a rising Power,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (sep-
tember 2007): 515–534; legro, Rethinking the World.
5 sidhu, Mehta, and Jones, Shaping the Emerging World. 
6  although it has been criticized on conceptual grounds, soft power captures a dimension of state actions to advance their interests in the inter-
national system that is particularly useful for discussions of Brazil. For an extended discussion, see David a. Baldwin, “Power and international 
relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Thomas risse, First (london: sage, 2002), 177–191.
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of this paper, a state is recognized as attempting to 
rise when it seeks membership in a major power 
institution.7 This distinguishes emerging powers 
from middle powers, the latter of which are coun-
tries with significant capabilities that nevertheless 
accept the status quo and do not seek to partici-
pate directly in the shaping of international order. 
Historically, rising powers might have acquired 
dreadnaughts or sought membership in the Coun-
cil of the league of Nations. Today, it would in-
clude states campaigning to become a permanent 
member on the U.N. security Council or join the 
small group of states possessing nuclear weapons. 
These traits have been characteristic of the few 
states that have historically had the power to par-
ticipate in shaping the rules and regimes govern-
ing the international system.8 
By seeking access to these exclusive clubs, rising 
powers reveal their intention to join the group of 
states that devise the world order, but the ques-
tion then becomes what kind of order they seek.9 
scholars distinguish between rising powers with 
reformist, revisionist, and revolutionary inten-
tions towards the global order.10 reformist rising 
powers are those that accept the rules of the ex-
isting order, but pursue changes in the system to 
accommodate their interests. revisionist powers 
may accept many rules of the existing internation-
al order, but they also seek changes in the way the 
rules are implemented. The United states began its 
rise in the late 19th century as a reformist power, 
but both President Wilson and President roos-
evelt adopted decidedly revisionist positions when 
U.s. power peaked in the wake of World War i and 
World War ii respectively, advocating for self-de-
termination of nations and the end of european 
empires. revolutionary rising powers are those 
that seek to replace the existing international or-
der with a new one of their own devising, as was 
the case with revolutionary France in the late 18th 
and early 19th century or the soviet Union. revo-
lutionary powers, because they threaten the order 
devised by the established powers, are the most 
likely to provoke systemic conflict. reformist or 
revisionist powers, on the other hand, may be able 
to rise peacefully, especially if the changes they 
demand in the international order can be accom-
modated by the existing major powers at a lower 
cost than the alternative, i.e. continuing to exclude 
them from membership in exclusive rule-making 
bodies or preventing them from acquiring greater 
capabilities.
Finally, becoming a major power requires more 
than intentions; it requires the opportunity to 
shape the rules and regimes governing the inter-
national order. Power is relative, and shifts in the 
power, capabilities, and intentions of other states in 
the system, particularly among the existing major 
powers, also produce opportunities for rising pow-
ers. The conclusion of major wars and consequent 
7  Middle powers are traditionally viewed as states with regionally significant capabilities, but who accept the rules governing the international 
order rather than participate in making them. Major powers have the capability to participate in shaping and maintaining the rules governing the 
international order. 
8  Hart and Jones have a discussion of contemporary ex post indicators for emerging powers in a recent article. See andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. 
Jones, “How Do rising Powers rise?,” Survival 52, no. 6 (December 2010): 63–88, doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.540783. These indicators are 
useful for confirming the trajectory of emerging powers today, but they cannot be fully replicated in earlier historical periods. They may also 
miss some ‘failed’ cases of attempts to rise.
9  Deborah larson, T.V. Paul and William Wohlforth, Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2014), 19-27; 
David r. Mares, “emerging Powers in an era of systemic Change: Brazil as an emerging ‘revisionist status Quo’ Power?” (presented at the 
rising Powers: is Peaceful accommodation Possible?, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 2013).
10 ibid.
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diplomacy are often revealing because they are 
moments when it is possible to observe which 
powers, rising or established, have the greatest in-
fluence in shaping the rules governing the global 
order. Opportunities may also emerge as different 
domains of the international order, such as securi-
ty, finance, trade, or the global commons, become 
more or less salient in interstate relations. This 
provides rising powers with windows in which 
their capabilities might have an outsized impact 
relative to their historical means. For example, a 
state’s capacity to respond to global conflict such 
as World War i required different aspects of state 
power than responses to a global financial crisis 
such as the Great Depression. Contemporary chal-
lenges in the global commons, such as coordinat-
ing responses to climate change or public health, 
may emphasize yet another currency of power. 
These moments are both challenges for the estab-
lished powers and opportunities for the emerging 
powers.
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brazil’s rise in HisTory
Brazil’s long-held aspiration for greatness is captured in a quote by Joaquim Nabuco, Bra-
zil’s first ambassador to the United states (1905-
1910), “Brazil has always been conscious of its size, 
and it has been governed by a prophetic sense with 
regard to its future.”11 Brazil’s intention has been 
to achieve equality with the major powers in the 
international system both de facto as well as de 
jure.12 While this aspiration would require reform 
or revision of the existing international status quo, 
Brazil has never had the intention or capability to 
revolutionize the international system. Given Bra-
zil’s ambitions, its strategies have focused on how 
to take advantage of opportunities to rise and alter 
the international order to accommodate its prefer-
ences while avoiding direct confrontation with the 
established powers. 
Brazilian thinking about the international order 
has historically been the province of three elites—
diplomatic, economic and national security—that 
by and large share the aspiration to major power 
status. Until very recently, Brazilian society has 
been inward looking and preoccupied with domes-
tic politics, although this has begun to change.13 
Most foreign policy debates still occur among a 
very limited range of actors. These elites may dif-
fer in their analyses of the most relevant capability 
for Brazil’s rise, but frequently their prescriptions 
are similar. They share a consensus that econom-
ic development is a necessary precondition for 
achieving an international status commensurate 
with Brazil’s geographic and demographic size, al-
though there is a range of views on the degree to 
which protectionism or openness should govern 
the economy.14 Brazil’s elites also share a preference 
for peaceful relations among states and non-inter-
vention in others’ affairs. While alternative views, 
by economic elites favoring an open economy or 
national security elites favoring military capabili-
ties, have held sway for short periods of time, they 
have not produced an enduring shift in the histori-
cal trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy.15 
Brazil’s capabilities have been those of a developing 
country for much of its history. Until it industrial-
ized during and after World War ii, Brazil largely 
relied on commodity exports such as rubber, sug-
ar, and coffee for its income. industrialization ex-
panded Brazil’s capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s, 
but it struggled to maintain macroeconomic sta-
bility throughout much of this period, leading to 
bouts of hyperinflation and a severe debt crisis in 
the 1980s. its military capabilities remained quite 
modest during much of its history. Professional-
ization began with the influence of German and 
later French military missions before and after 
World War i. equipping the armed forces required 
assistance from allied powers in World War i and 
World War ii since Brazil lacked a significant de-
fense industry until the 1970s. The military by and 
large focused on internal affairs, even though its 
primary mission was theoretically the defense of 
11 Celso lafer, “Brazilian international identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” Daedalus 129, no. 2 (spring 2000): 207–238.
12  Miriam Gomes saraiva, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy: Causal Beliefs in Formulation and Pragmatism in Practice,” in Latin American Foreign Policies: 
Between Ideology and Pragmatism, ed. Gian luca Gardini and Peter W. lambert (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 52–55; Celso lafer, 
“Brazilian international identity and Foreign Policy.”
13  Celso amorim, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under President lula (2003-2010): an Overview,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53, no. 
sPe (2010): 239.
14  andrew Hurrell, “Brazil: What Kind of rising state?,” in Rising States, Rising Institutions, ed. alan s. alexandroff and andrew F. Cooper (Wash-
ington DC: Brookings institution Press, 2010), 131–133.
15 Gomes saraiva, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy: Causal Beliefs in Formulation and Pragmatism in Practice,” 52–53. 
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Brazil’s sovereignty.16 although it was large in size 
and natural resources, shortcomings in technolo-
gy, industry, education, and infrastructure meant 
that much of Brazil’s potential, particularly in 
terms of hard power, remained latent.17 
still, as the largest country in latin america, Brazil 
has consistently been able to assert its interests in 
the region, and to outside powers; its size makes 
it a natural ‘representative’ for south america. 
Brazil’s chancellor (1902-1912), Baron rio Bran-
co, first saw an opportunity to rise in the shifting 
balance of power that preceded World War i. He 
sought out diplomatic settings and partnerships 
where Brazil’s marginal additional contribution to 
maintaining the status quo might be parlayed into 
a seat at the table when the rules were discussed. 
Brazil participated in the international congresses 
and meetings that proliferated before World War i, 
initially advocating the juridical equality of states 
under international law, which was then a status 
largely restricted to the european powers. Part of 
his strategy was devoted to developing an informal 
alliance with the United states, a country that had 
sided with Brazil in a number of territorial arbi-
trations in south america. Brazil had traditionally 
good relations with the United states during the 
19th century, which it viewed as another outsid-
er in a hemisphere of spanish-speaking republics. 
The United states was also a power that was suc-
cessfully rising in the early 20th century, and sim-
ilar to Brazil, it was suspicious of european great 
power politics; Brazil therefore viewed the United 
states as potentially most sympathetic to its own 
aspirations.18
World War i provided an expanded opportunity 
for Brazil to pursue its ambitions in the renegoti-
ation of the international order that subsequently 
occurred at Versailles. it not only joined the allied 
cause in World War i as a co-belligerent, providing 
anti-submarine naval patrols in the atlantic, but 
also sought a permanent seat on the Council of 
the league of Nations in the peace that followed. 
This pursuit of a status in the league of Nations re-
served for the great powers is illustrative of Brazil’s 
self-perception as a potential major power. Brazil 
actually withdrew from the league in 1926 when 
the recently defeated Germany was granted mem-
bership in the Council in precedence over Brazil’s 
claim as a member of the victorious alliance.19 
Withdrawal from the league was a recognition 
that Brazil’s strategy had failed to convince the ex-
isting major powers that it should have the same 
status in decisions about the structure of world 
order.
in the inter-war period, Brazil initially hedged its 
bets by maintaining good relations with the United 
states and very active trade with Germany.20 Bra-
zil’s leaders viewed the competition among major 
powers as an opportunity to extract assistance and 
concessions. still, Brazil joined the allied cause 
after the United states entered World War ii and 
16  Frederick M. Nunn, “Military Professionalism and Professional Militariam in Brazil, 1870-1970: Historical Perspectives and Political implica-
tions,” Journal of Latin American Studies 4, no. 1 (May 1972): 29–54.
17  rosemary Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century (Washington DC: inter-american 
Development Bank, 1998), 54–63; stanley e. Hilton, “The armed Forces and industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military autonomy 
(1889-1954),” The Hispanic American Historical Review 62, no. 4 (November 1982): 629–673.
18 e. Bradford Burns, “Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 9, no. 2 (april 1967): 195–212.
19  stanley e. Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: elite images and Foreign Policy strategy, 1919-1929,” Journal of Latin American Studies 
12, no. 2 (November 1980): 341–364.
20  stanley e. Hilton, “Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-rio de Janeiro ‘axis’ during the World War ii era,” The Hispanic American Histori-
cal Review 59, no. 2 (May 1979): 201–231.
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again sought to become a major power by joining 
the victorious allies in the hope it would be able 
to help write the rules governing the peace. To 
strengthen its claims, Brazil participated to a more 
significant extent than in World War i, contribut-
ing an army division to the italian front. Brazil also 
participated vigorously in the diplomacy surround-
ing the founding of the United Nations at san Fran-
cisco in 1945. President Franklin Delano roosevelt 
even advocated for Brazil’s permanent membership 
on the U.N. security Council when this body was 
first proposed. However, this idea was met with re-
sistance from the United Kingdom and the soviet 
Union, and after roosevelt’s death, President Harry 
s. Truman agreed and dropped the proposal.21 
Brazil’s first two attempts to rise reflected reformist 
goals, as it sought admittance to great power status 
through allying with the leading powers of the sys-
tem. although Brazil was able to participate diplo-
matically to a very significant extent in post-con-
flict negotiations, the shortcomings in its hard and 
soft power capabilities were such that the existing 
major powers were able to set aside Brazil’s claims 
to higher status its contributions to resolving the 
crisis were sufficient to gain it admission to global 
diplomatic councils, but did not allow it to claim 
permanent status as a major power. 
One consequence of these failed attempts to rise 
was an increase in the distance between the Unit-
ed states and Brazil. Perceptions of Us ingratitude 
following WWii and periodic criticism of Brazil-
ian policies during the Cold War contributed to 
a belief among some Brazilians that the United 
states was at best unreliable, and at worst trying 
to hold Brazil back from its natural place as a ma-
jor power.22 One of the lessons Brazil drew from its 
experience mobilizing for war on the allied side in 
World War ii was that its nascent industrial base 
made it highly dependent on the United states for 
technology, military and development assistance. 
During the war, Brazil sometimes considered the 
priority placed by the FDr administration on sup-
plying Brazil’s requirements inadequate. Following 
the war, Brazilian governments expressed dismay 
at a U.s. policy of balancing between argentine 
and Brazilian requests for aid. Brazil considered 
this a particularly noxious policy given that they 
had fought with the Us during the war while ar-
gentina maintained neutrality and harbored axis 
sympathies.23 They also were critical of the per-
ceived higher priority placed by the United states 
on rebuilding defeated enemies in Germany and 
Japan rather than on providing help to its allies. 
These Brazilian criticisms did not consider the 
broad array of interests that the U.s. managed af-
ter the war, but they became part of an enduring 
‘black legend’ in U.s.-Brazil relations.
The proliferation of new actors in the interna-
tional order in the 1960s provided a new kind of 
opportunity for Brazil, one that would lead it to 
briefly adopt a more revisionist stance towards the 
international order. Decolonization produced a 
large number of new states led by relatively inex-
perienced leaders. Brazil stood out in this setting 
where its capabilities, relative wealth, and diplo-
matic experience provided it with an advantage 
over the smaller and newer states. Many of the 
newly independent states viewed the rules of the 
international order as devised by the victorious 
21 Celso lafer, “Brazilian international identity and Foreign Policy”; ibid.
22 sean W. Burges, Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 24-28.
23 Hilton, “The armed Forces and industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military autonomy (1889-1954).”
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powers as inequitable. in response, Brazil’s im-
mediate post-WWii civilian presidents—Vargas, 
Quadros and Goulart—pursued a foreign policy 
that cultivated solidarity among newly decolonized 
developing countries in africa and asia. Though 
foreign policy diversification ceased following the 
1964 military coup, as the Brazilian armed forc-
es viewed it in the same context as Goulart’s lean 
to the left in domestic politics, it re-emerged four 
decades later. During the 2000s, Brazil sought sta-
tus vis-à-vis major powers as a representative and 
spokesperson for ‘the rest,’ taking advantage of its 
position as a middleman between developing and 
developed countries to extract concessions and 
advance its own interests.24 
The decline of U.s. power during the 1970s relative 
to other actors in the system provided Brazil 
another opening to claim the status of rising power. 
The so-called ‘Brazilian Miracle’ during the 1960s 
and 1970s, which combined industrialization, 
technology acquisition, and sustained high rates 
of economic growth, prompted renewed global 
attention to the possibility that Brazil was an 
emerging power.25 This was also a period of military 
government in Brazil. even though the armed 
forces’ focus was national security, they were keenly 
interested in the interrelation of economic and 
military power.26 The Brazilian defense industry 
developed rapidly, which allowed Brazil to become 
a major arms exporter to developing countries.27 
Brazil also moved vigorously to acquire nuclear 
technology. The military governments went so 
far as to institute parallel nuclear programs: an 
official program to acquire nuclear technology 
for power generation and an unofficial program 
designed to acquire the capability to develop 
nuclear weapons. Germany agreed to assist Brazil 
with its official program despite opposition from 
the United states, although the technology it 
transferred for fuel enrichment was not well-tested 
or particularly successful. Brazil refused to sign 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty advocated 
by the United states because it would enshrine an 
unequal status for nuclear and non-nuclear states 
in international law. Moreover, the treaty would 
preclude Brazil from acquiring the full spectrum 
of nuclear technology, including the option to 
acquire weapons. Brazil’s parallel covert military 
programs also acquired considerable technology 
useful for overall nuclear development, although it 
is still debatable how close Brazil was to acquiring 
nuclear explosive technology when its new 
democratic leaders decided to end the program 
in the late 1980s.28 While this opportunity was 
sufficient to allow Brazil to evade compliance with 
new rules introduced by the United states, it fell 
short of shaping the new non-proliferation regime 
to meet its own preferences.
Brazil’s changing approach to improving its 
position in the international system during the 
24 sean Burges, “Brazil as Bridge between Old and New Powers,” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013): 577–594.
25  emanuel adler, The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987); Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976).
26  David Pion-Berlin, “latin american National security Doctrines: Hard and softline Themes,” Armed Forces & Society 15, no. 3 (spring 1989): 
411–429.
27  ethan B. Kapstein, “The Brazilian Defense industry and the international system,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1990): 
579–596.; etel solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).
28  Brazil eventually signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998. ibid.; Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving 
Identity (Washington DC: Carnegie endowment for international Peace, 2014).
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20th century reflects an adaptation to emerging 
opportunities more than a response to domestic 
politics. initially, Baron rio Branco and his suc-
cessors saw that working with the United states, a 
state that had its own interest in revising the global 
order and shared Brazil’s identity as an outsider in 
latin america, was preferable to attempting an al-
liance with a european power that would defend 
the status quo. The military came to share this 
view, especially after working with the Us armed 
forces during World War ii. Once it was clear after 
the war that rising as a partner of the United states 
would not succeed, Brazil shifted course and fo-
cused on developing its own capabilities. This view 
was supported by Brazil’s national security elites, 
particularly the military. However, the military 
also supported rapid economic development and 
pursued a largely peaceful foreign policy during 
its time in power, policy preferences shared by 
diplomatic and economic elites. While there are 
differences among elites as to the means to power 
Brazil’s rise, the fact that they share the same goal 
and values often produces a convergence amongst 
them on foreign policy. 
Despite relative agreement on foreign policy, shifts 
in domestic politics affected Brazil’s rise through 
their impact on capabilities. Brazil’s troubled poli-
tics during the 1950s and 1960s, marked by repeat-
ed military interference in civilian politics, made 
it difficult to make the case for Brazil becoming a 
major power. after the military came to power in 
1964, repression and economic growth at home 
provided sufficient stability to support a renewed 
emphasis on Brazil’s rise in the 1970s. The return 
to democracy in 1985 brought civilians back into 
control of Brazil’s foreign policy, but its opportu-
nity to rise was again eclipsed by domestic poli-
tics. The new democratic governments inherited a 
major debt crisis which forced Brazilian leaders to 
prioritize economic development and macroeco-
nomic stability in the 1980s and 1990s. it was only 
after the successful policies of the Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso administration (1995-2003) laid the 
foundations for economic and political consolida-
tion at home that Brazil was able to resume its rise.
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reaCHing again for Major 
Power sTaTus?
Brazil’s actions on the international stage today suggest that it still aspires to join the ranks 
of major powers. Brazil has a new opportunity in 
the fading of the post-Cold War unipolar moment 
and the simultaneous rise of a number of emerg-
ing powers. Growth, macroeconomic stability, and 
democratic consolidation have enhanced its capa-
bilities. When it comes to global diplomacy and 
governance, Brazil actively participates in the same 
institutions and forums as the major powers with 
the intention of shaping the rules of the coming 
world order. Brazil has taken advantage of its rise 
during the past decade to campaign for a perma-
nent seat on the United Nations security Council, 
and it has taken a greater role in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations through its command of the military 
mission in Haiti since 2004. Brazil has also joined 
the G-20 group of Finance and economy Ministers, 
and has engaged in multilateral efforts to address 
the consequences of the 2008 global financial cri-
sis through institutions such as the international 
Monetary Fund (iMF). additionally, Brazil has 
taken a leadership role in the WTO, particularly 
during the Doha trade round, where it led a major 
group of developing nations that opposed europe-
an and Us proposals on global trade. in global cli-
mate change negotiations and public health, Brazil 
has established itself as a leading voice.29 
in terms of hard power capabilities, Brazil’s econo-
my is the 7th largest in the world in terms of GDP 
(2013), and the country has made large strides in 
reducing poverty and growing its middle class.30 
its national development bank, BNDes, is a very 
significant player in both internal and regional 
development, with a total lending volume three 
times that of the World Bank in 2011.31 This lend-
ing is part of an industrial policy designed to re-
quire borrowers to buy products from Brazil, con-
tributing to its economic development while at the 
same time increasing its international influence. 
However, Brazil has shied away from committing 
economic resources beyond south america. it has 
also been reluctant to use the ‘hard’ dimension of 
economic power, either in the form of sanctions 
or side payments to other states. its international 
development assistance, largely focused on africa, 
remains quite modest.32 
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Brazil’s military capabilities remain particularly 
constrained relative to other dimensions of state 
power. This reflects Brazil’s historically peaceful 
security environment and its preference for diplo-
matic over military solutions to conflict. in 2012, 
Brazil was 68th in the world in terms of military 
expenditure as percentage of GDP, and 11th in the 
world in terms of total dollars spent (measured 
in current 2012 UsD).33 Brazil spends 1.5 percent 
of its GDP on defense, which is a relatively low-
er percentage by the standards of other emerging 
powers. additionally over 80 percent of its defense 
spending goes to salaries and benefits which, while 
not unusual for a developing country, undermines 
Brazil’s ability to equip its armed forces. experts 
assess that over 50 percent of the Brazilian Navy 
ships and air Force platforms are non-operation-
al.34 although Brazil has steadily increased defense 
spending over the past two decades—and its de-
fense budget accounts for over half of latin amer-
ica’s total defense expenditure—this has not yet 
translated into concrete capabilities that would al-
low its armed forces to operate effectively beyond 
its borders outside of peacekeeping missions.35
33  Data for 2012 are drawn from stockholm international Peace research institute (siPri) statistics. regarding its methodology, siPri’s website 
states, “Where possible, siPri military expenditure data include all current and capital expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peace-
keeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be 
trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. such expenditures should include: (a) military and civil personnel, 
including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) mil-
itary research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures 
on previous military activities, such as veterans’ benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction are excluded.” http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database/copy_of_sources_methods.
34  susanne Gratius, The International Arena and Emerging Powers: Stabilising or Destabilising Forces?, FriDe Comment (Madrid: Fundación para 
las relaciones internacionales y el Diálogo exterior, april 2008), http://www.fride.org/download/COM_emerging_powers_eNG_abr08.pdf; 
João Fábio Bertonha, “Brazil: an emerging Military Power? The Problem of the Use of Force in Brazilian international relations in the 21st 
Century,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53, no. 2 (2010): 107–124.
35 Hart and Jones, “How Do rising Powers rise?,” 68.
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in contrast, Brazil wields significant soft power 
relative to many states. it ranks 17th in the world, 
according to the Monocle/Institute for Government 
2012 ranking, ahead of developing countries and 
many of the rising powers.36 The emphasis of its 
foreign policy on equity, inclusion, and universal 
institutions are appealing to many states, espe-
cially small and middle powers. its diplomats are 
widely respected for their professionalism and 
effectiveness. Brazilians consider themselves to 
be particularly adroit at bringing together parties 
with opposing points of view.37 Domestically, Bra-
zil provides an attractive narrative of economic 
growth with a strong state and a growing degree of 
social inclusion—something that many developing 
countries want and many developed countries at-
tempt to promote through their foreign assistance 
programs. as Brazil has substantially consolidated 
its democracy over the past three decades, its po-
litical success story contributes to its prestige in in-
ternational and regional forums. Brazilian culture 
has long been attractive around the world, ranging 
from its highly innovative music to stellar soccer 
teams to sophisticated telenovelas.38 even when 
Brazilian Minister of Defense Celso amorim talks 
about hardening Brazil’s power, most of his pro-
posals feature the use of diplomacy and coopera-
tive defense relations to extend the zone of peace 
around Brazil.39 
Brazil still faces the puzzle of how to become a ma-
jor power, given that it has an unbalanced portfolio 
of capabilities.40 When it comes to issues involving 
the global commons, such as the environment and 
public health, Brazil has enough soft power and 
economic significance to block actions by other 
major powers. The impact of Brazil’s capabilities in 
the arena of global economic governance are more 
ambiguous, since Brazil’s economy is large enough 
to justify participation in major power forums, but 
it is reluctant to commit its resources to maintain-
ing or revising the existing order on global trade 
or finance. On the security dimension, Brazil has 
by far the weakest hand to play, and it has had to 
accept the decisions of other major powers and try 
to ameliorate their impact, as occurred during the 
libya 2011 and syria 2011 conflicts.
Brazil’s contemporary rise benefits from two new 
opportunities. The first is Brazil’s ascendancy in 
south america. For most of the 20th century, ar-
gentina was a regional rival to Brazil in economic 
and military terms. The argentine-Brazil rivalry 
is now history. The likelihood of interstate war 
in south america that would involve Brazil has 
become very low, which reduces Brazil’s need for 
military capabilities, an area in which it has lagged 
behind other rising powers. 
36  Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders III: A 2012 Ranking of Soft Power (london: institute for Government, 2012). according to the study, 
it is based on “a broad set of statistical metrics and subjective data (50 metrics in total), comparing countries according to the quality of their 
government; diplomatic infrastructure; cultural output; capacity for education; and their appeal to business. The data is normalised, grouped into 
sub-indices, and calculated using our composite index formula to arrive at a single score for each country included in the study.”
37 andrew Hurrell, “Brazil and the New Global Order,” Current History 109, no. 724 (February 2010): 60–66.
38  lourdes Casanova and Julian Kassum, From Soft to Hard Power: In Search of Brazil’s Winning Blend, Faculty & research Working Paper (iN-
seaD, 2013); andreia soares e Castro, “2014 FiFa World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games: Brazil’s strategy ‘To Win Hearts and Minds’ Through 
sports and Football,” Public Diplomacy, Winter 2013, 28–35. 
39  Celso amorim, “Hardening Brazil’s soft Power,” Project Syndicate, July 16, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-more-robust-
defense-policy-for-brazil-by-celso-amorim on January 8.
40  secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático, Brazilian foreign policy handbook. (Brasília: Fundação alexandre de Gusmão, 2008); Matias spektor, 
“ideias de ativismo regional: a Transformação Das leituras Brasileiras Da região,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53, no. 1 (2010): 
25–44.
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The other new opportunity arises from the fad-
ing of the post-Cold War unipolar moment of Us 
hegemony in favor of greater multipolarity in the 
last decade. This offers rising powers the possi-
bility to influence the international order more 
actively as their own capabilities improve relative 
to those of established major powers. Moreover, 
there are a number of powers who are critical of 
the existing liberal international order to varying 
degrees: Brazil, russia, China, india, south afri-
ca, Turkey, and iran.41 This allows Brazil to seek 
out collaborators with common interests in revis-
ing the international system in the hope that the 
sum will have greater impact than any one alone. 
Brazil also has an advantage in seeking collabora-
tion with other critical powers because it is not a 
regional rival of any of them.
More broadly, the proliferation of states in the 
international system due to decolonization after 
World War ii and the collapse of the soviet Union 
in 1991 offers Brazil the opportunity to lead in 
multilateral settings by serving as a bridge between 
the major powers and the developing world.42 Bra-
zil had once experimented with this in the 1960s, 
but the present global setting offers even more 
possibilities to leverage the number of actors in 
the system to its advantage in seeking major power 
status.
This next section discusses how Brazil is taking 
advantage of new opportunities, first in south 
america and second through its relations with 
other emerging powers and developing states. it 
will then examine Brazil’s participation in global 
governance—the shaping and maintaining of in-
ternational order—across three different domains: 
security, economics, and the global commons. 
These domains are chosen because they emphasize 
different aspects of state power, and highlight how 
Brazil’s uneven capabilities either contribute to or 
limit its ability to successfully act as a major power.
41 Hart and Jones, “How Do rising Powers rise?”
42 Burges, “Brazil as Bridge between Old and New Powers.”
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brazil and a new souTH 
aMeriCa 
Although its diplomats are fond of denying any ambition to regional leadership, Brazil 
has made a significant effort to establish itself as 
the major power in south america, albeit using 
a cooperative approach based on building new 
regional institutions. However, its reluctance to 
use hard power and its avoidance of constraints 
or costly commitments have all limited its ability 
to enforce the new arrangements. so while Brazil 
can point to any number of regional initiatives it 
has established, its leadership is hollowed out by 
its inability to compel, convince or pay off other 
states in the Western Hemisphere to follow its lead 
consistently.
During the past decade, Brazil has worked steadi-
ly to limit potential and actual challengers to its 
rise within south america. its principal vehicle 
has been regional integration and multilateral di-
plomacy. lafer argues that Brazil has long had an 
interest in integrating the south american region, 
but in practical terms, concrete moves towards 
regional integration only gathered momentum 
in the 1980s following the re-democratization of 
argentina and Brazil.43 Previously, Brazil and ar-
gentina had viewed each other as peer rivals in 
military and economic terms. argentina’s defeat 
in the Malvinas conflict with the U.K. removed 
the basis for military rivalry, and democratization 
brought to power civilian leaders inclined to pre-
vent it from recurring. Brazil negotiated a bilateral 
nuclear nonproliferation regime with argentina 
and ended its covert nuclear program. The reduc-
tion in security tensions was complemented by the 
negotiation of Mercosul, a new common market 
arrangement initially with argentina in 1988 but 
by its ratification in 1991 also with Paraguay and 
Uruguay. The Brazilian intention was for Mer-
cosul to eventually negotiate the incorporation of 
the south american region into Brazil’s economic 
orbit. at the prompting of argentina, Brazil also 
agreed to add a political dimension to Mercosul 
through its support for a defense of democra-
cy clause as a requirement for membership. it is 
worth emphasizing that this set of negotiations 
and agreements transformed Brazil’s main rival in 
south america into a partner.44 
The other major obstacle to Brazil’s preeminence 
in south america is the United states, who has 
historically played a leadership role in the Western 
Hemisphere. in particular, Brazil’s rise was threat-
ened by a revitalized United states agenda for 
hemispheric cooperation and economic integra-
tion in the wake of the Cold War. During the Clin-
ton administration, the United states initiated a 
process of presidential-led summits of the ameri-
cas in 1994, where it also proposed the negotiation 
of a Free Trade area of the americas (FTaa) by 
2005. additionally, it began a hemispheric security 
discussion through a series of Defense Ministerials 
of the americas. Containing the U.s. agenda was 
a difficult challenge for Brazil not only due to the 
power disparity between the two states but also 
due to Brazil’s particular weakness in the wake of 
the major 1980s debt crisis. Nevertheless, Brazil 
used its institutional role as co-chair of the FTaa 
to raise questions about the U.s. hemispheric trade 
project. in discussions with other latin american 
43 lafer, “Brazilian international identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future.”
44  luigi Manzetti, “The Political economy of MerCOsUr,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 35, no. 4 (1993): 101–141; arturo 
C. sotomayor Velázquez, “Civil-Military affairs and security institutions in the southern Cone: The sources of argentine-Brazilian Nuclear 
Cooperation,” Latin American Politics and Society 46, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 29–60.
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states, it cast FTaa as an expansion of the North 
american Free Trade agreement (NaFTa), which 
might threaten regional economic development 
prospects. it also offered to expand Mercosur as a re-
gional platform that might precede an FTaa, there-
by allowing south america to negotiate on a more 
equitable basis with the United states.45 This enabled 
Brazil to delay any agreement on the FTaa, and the 
negotiations concluded without success in 2005.
Brazil laid the groundwork for securing its region-
al leadership through new multilateral institutions 
that excluded the United states. President Fernan-
do Henrique Cardoso convened a summit of south 
american presidents in 2000 where he proposed an 
iniciativa para la integración de la infraestructura 
regional suramericana (iirsa or south american 
initiative for regional infrastructure integration) 
with support from the Brazilian development bank 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento econômico e 
social (BNDes). This evolved under President lula 
da silva through a short-lived Council of south 
american Nations, which then became the Union 
of south american Nations (UNasUr) in 2008. 
UNasUr not only excluded the United states, but 
also Canada, Mexico, and Central america, which 
were seen as too close to the United states. south 
american regional institutions proved useful to Bra-
zil during the 2008 crisis between Colombia, Ven-
ezuela, and ecuador, in which the three countries 
engaged in military mobilization following a Co-
lombian airstrike on a FarC rebel encampment in 
ecuadorean territory. They also played a role in re-
solving the crisis over the 2009 coup in Honduras. in 
both cases, Brazil was able use its alternative regional 
institutions to lead the response to the crisis while 
limiting the role of the United states.46 Most recently, 
Brazil has worked to create the Comunidad de esta-
dos de latinoamérica y el Caribe (CelaC), which 
includes south, Central american and Caribbean 
states but excludes the United states and Canada. 
However, Brazil’s historical reluctance to pool sov-
ereignty with other states through international re-
gimes is reflected in the characteristics of the south 
american multilateral institutions it created over 
the past decade. Mercosul, UNasUr and CelaC 
all have limited budgets, personnel, and inconsistent 
leadership. after more than a decade, iirsa has in 
fact built very little infrastructure for regional inte-
gration. Brazil has also has been willing to under-
mine or ignore Mercosul standards when it was con-
venient, whether it was in market disputes over auto 
exports or in the admittance of Venezuela in 2012 
to membership in violation of accession standards. 
This highlights an essential problem in Brazil’s mul-
tilateralism: a reluctance to commit to the rules of 
the institutions it creates. in the absence of capacity 
and commitment, the new multilateral institutions 
have essentially devolved into opportunities for 
presidential summitry in the region. They provide 
forums for ad-hoc crisis resolution or interpersonal 
negotiations rather than regimes that govern inter-
state relations or bind the actions of their member 
states. 
Brazil may have successfully excluded the United 
states from UNasUr and CelaC, but it is not able 
to prevent or persuade other states in the region 
from defecting from the regional institutions it 
has organized to conclude their own arrangements 
with Washington. although some scholars have 
45 richard e. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report (Washington DC: Peterson institute, 1997).
46  José antonio sanahuJa, “Multilateralismo Y regionalismo en Clave suramericana: el Caso de UNasUr,” Pensamiento Propio 33, los Desafíos 
Del Multilateralismo en américa latina (June 2011): 115–158.
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focused on declining U.s. influence in the region, 
U.s. bilateral and multilateral initiatives have ex-
panded across the region. The United states has con-
cluded free trade agreements with Colombia, Chile 
and Peru, and with the Central american region 
through the Central america Free Trade agreement 
(CaFTa); it is now engaged in a major multilater-
al trade negotiation, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
with Mexico, Peru and Chile and a range of asian 
states.47 On the defense front, the United states has 
continued its extensive military-to-military relations 
with states across Central america and the Caribbe-
an, and since 9/11, it has greatly expanded security 
ties to Mexico. in south america, the United states 
has built a strong partnership with the Colombian 
government, up to and including negotiations for 
basing agreements for U.s. forces. While the close 
U.s.-Colombia relationship has discomfited Co-
lombia’s neighbors, Brazil has been able to do little 
about this relationship given its unwillingness to as-
sume the diplomatic, economic, or security costs of 
assisting the Colombians in resolving their internal 
conflict. Thus while Brazilian influence has grown 
across south america, it has not prevented exter-
nal powers such as the United states from pursuing 
their own interests in the region. 
Despite Brazil’s relative size and capabilities, it 
has deliberately avoided using military power 
in south america to protect its interests or as-
sert its leadership. The armed forces are mostly 
concerned with the defense of sovereignty, borders, 
and infrastructure. This focus is partly driven by a 
mission to protect the ‘green’ amazon (its inter-
nal territory) and the ‘blue’ amazon, where its off-
shore deep water oil reserves are located.48 Brazil’s 
2008 national defense strategy and the new Brazil-
ian defense white paper developed from 2011 to 
2013 call for investment in advanced technologies, 
space, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; this is 
in keeping with the government’s focus on nation-
al development. Brazil has opposed most forms of 
overt military intervention in the affairs of other 
states, and since its democratization in 1985, it has 
mostly limited its participation in military opera-
tions to internal tasks and U.N. Chapter Vi peace-
keeping operations within the americas and the 
lusophone world, most recently leading the U.N. 
peacekeeping mission to Haiti.49 even behavior by 
neighboring states that affected Brazil’s interests 
directly —for example, Bolivia’s expropriation of 
Brazilian Petrobras interests in 2006, the Colom-
bian-Venezuelan-ecuadorean crisis in 2008, or 
the Colombian agreement over Us military basing 
rights in 2010—has been dealt with diplomatically 
rather than militarily.50 By minimizing the security 
dimension of regional relations, Brazil is attempt-
ing to avoid incentives for its neighbors to remili-
tarize. However this low-risk strategy does not dis-
suade other states in the region from challenging 
its leadership because they find dissent relatively 
costless.
47  russell Crandall, “The Post-american Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an autonomous latin america,” Foreign Affairs 90 (June 2011), http://
heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/fora90&section=49; Christopher sabatini and Jason Marczak, “Obama’s 
Tango, restoring U.s. leadership in latin america,” Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2010, 3; adam isacson, Joy Olson, and lisa Haugaard, Below the 
Radar: US Military Programs with Latin America, 1997-2007 (Center for international Policy, the latin america Working Group education Fund, 
and the Washington Office on latin america, March 2007), http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/27932.
48  andrew Fishman and Max Manwaring, Brazil’s Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine, Colloquium Brief (Carlyle Barracks, Pa: strategic 
studies institute, army War College, 2009); Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional (Brasilia, Brasil: Ministerio do Defesa, 2012), http://www.defesa.
gov.br/index.php/ultimas-noticias/3869-24072012-defesa-politica-estrategia-e-livro-branco-de-defesa-nacional-conheca-os-documentos-en-
viados-pela-presidenta-da-republica-a-apreciacao-do-congresso-nacional.
49  arturo C. sotomayor Velázquez, “Different Paths and Divergent Policies in the UN security system: Brazil and Mexico in Comparative Per-
spective,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 3 (June 2009): 364–278.
50  rafael antonio Duarte Villa and Manuela Trindade Viana, “security issues during lula’s administration: From the reactive to the assertive 
approach,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53, no. sPe (2010): 91–114.
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Brazil’s strategy of consensus and institutional 
building has only had limited success in persuad-
ing other states in south america to adhere to the 
new order it has created or to support it in global 
forums. During the 2000s, Venezuela’s efforts un-
der President Hugo Chávez to raise its own status 
through oil diplomacy and relations with leftist 
and progressive movements in the hemisphere 
posed a challenge to Brazil. Brazil was able to 
contain Chávez by incorporating some of his pro-
posals into UNasUr and CelaC without giving 
Venezuela a leadership role.51 But even once Ven-
ezuela’s regional challenge faded, other alternative 
sub-regional institutions have emerged as an alter-
native to UNasUr and Mercosul, particularly the 
Pacific alliance between Colombia, Peru, Chile, 
and Mexico. The Pacific alliance is a challenge to 
Brazil’s leadership since it promotes free market 
policies based on global trade rather than more 
protectionist market policies based on regional 
integration. This undermines the integration log-
ic that Brazil has promoted within UNasUr. in 
addition, Mexico’s re-engagement with the inter-
national relations of south america, undermines 
Brazil’s claim to uncontested regional leadership. 
in Brazil’s most ambitious international gam-
bit, permanent membership in the U.N. security 
Council, Mexico, and argentina have consistently 
networked with other states concerned about se-
curity Council expansion to undermine Brazil’s 
claim.52 if Brazil cannot depend on the regional 
institutions it creates to build support its rise, then 
Brazilians should consider whether these institu-
tions are useful in their present form.
51  Daniel Flemes and Thorsten Wojczewski, “Contested leadership in Comparative Perspective: Power strategies in south asia and south america,” 
Asian Journal of Latin American Studies 24, no. 1 (2011): 1–27.
52  andrés Malamud, “a leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign 
Policy,” Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 3 (2011): 1–24; amaury de souza, Brazil’s International Agenda Revisited: Perceptions of the 
Brazilian Foreign Policy Community (Centro Brasileiro de relações internacionais, 2008).
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brazil and THe resT: 
relaTions wiTH rising 
Powers and THe develoPing 
world 
As previously mentioned, another major op-portunity for Brazil has been the emergence 
of other major powers and candidates for this sta-
tus, particularly india, China, russia and south 
africa. rather than viewing these states as com-
petitors, Brazil has sought cooperative ties with 
powers that are critical of the present order. Brazil’s 
global diplomacy also tries to position it as a leader 
of the developing countries and as a representative 
of the rest of the world to major power councils.53 
The underlying logic is to build support for Brazil’s 
own rise among developing countries and other 
rising powers, and then to parlay that leadership 
into efforts to gain recognition as a major power.
Brazil’s multilateral networks among the rising 
powers—BriCs, iBsa, and BasiC—have served a 
similar function to the alternative institutions Bra-
zil created within south america. They create ven-
ues that exclude the traditional major powers and 
provide opportunities to highlight the importance 
of the new major and rising powers. Brazil does not 
have much in common economically, politically, 
or culturally with other members of the BriCs, 
yet these states do share a critical view of the ex-
isting order. The rising powers have a shared inter-
est in defending their sovereignty and autonomy 
of action, as well as in opening room for their par-
ticipation in rule shaping related to the interna-
tional order. 
Unlike other rising powers, Brazil’s benign security 
environment means that it is not concerned with re-
gional rivalries, as is the case in the india-China re-
lationship. This offers Brazil the opportunity to play 
the role of coalition builder among the emerging 
powers. recognizing a strong brand, Brazil has been 
active in diplomacy among the BriCs, a concept 
first popularized by Goldman sachs to single out the 
rising economies of Brazil, russia, india and China, 
to which south africa was later added.54 although 
the output of the BriCs networking has produced 
little by way of institutions, there have been five sum-
mits of the BriCs presidents so far, mostly recently 
in 2013. Brazil has also pursued the iBsa concept, 
which is a more politically congenial subgrouping of 
the most democratic BriCs that includes south af-
rica and india.55 another multilateral grouping that 
has emerged, this time at the sidelines of global cli-
mate change talks in Copenhagen in 2009, is BasiC 
(Brazil, south africa, india, and China); they have 
advocated for the developed world to assume a share 
of the cost of remediating climate changes in propor-
tion to the historic damage caused by its economic 
growth.56 solidarity among the powers critical of the 
present order potentially provides Brazil with lever-
age in global negotiations and intergovernmental 
forums when it does decide to engage with the tradi-
tional major powers, as we will see when we examine 
Brazil’s actions in the security, economic and global 
commons domains.57
53 Burges, “Brazil as Bridge between Old and New Powers”; Hart and Jones, “How Do rising Powers rise?”
54  leslie elliott armijo, “The BriCs Countries (Brazil, russia, india, and China) as analytical Category: Mirage or insight?,” ASIAN PERSPEC-
TIVE-SEOUL- 31, no. 4 (2007): 7–42.
55  Chris alden and Marco antonio Vieira, “The New Diplomacy of the south: south africa, Brazil, india and Trilateralism,” Third World Quarter-
ly 26, no. 7 (October 2005): 1077–1095, doi:10.1080/01436590500235678.
56  stephen Minas, “FPC Briefing: BasiC Positions-Major emerging economies in the UN Climate Change Negotiations” (Foreign Policy Centre, 
June 2013).
57  Corival alves do Carmo and Cristina soreanu Pecequilo, “The Dynamics of Crisis: Brazil, the BriCs and the G-20,” OiKOs (rio de Janeiro) 11, 
no. 2 (2012): 306–325; Hart and Jones, “How Do rising Powers rise?,” 75–76. 
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Brazil’s other opportunity to justify accession to 
the ranks of the major powers is its claim to rep-
resent the growing number of small and middle 
powers in the international system when it comes 
to concerns about equity, distribution of resources, 
and the implementation of the current world or-
der.58 Brazil was a founding member of the Group 
of 77, a multilateral forum of developing countries 
formed in 1964 that is still active today with over 
130 members. as recently as November 2013, Bra-
zil led the G-77 at global climate change talks in 
Warsaw, Poland, proposing a methodology for as-
sessing historical responsibilities for greenhouse 
gas emissions that put the burden of remediation 
on the developed world.59 Brazil also plays a lead-
ing role in discussions on global health issues, par-
ticularly as they relate to criticizing the level of pat-
ent protection for drugs required for treatments of 
diseases such as HiV/aiDs.60 While Brazil clearly 
benefits from lower costs of treatments for its own 
citizens, it can also position itself as a champi-
on of the interests of other developing countries. 
lowering the cost of treatment by waiving intel-
lectual property protections for drugs is an issue 
area where Brazil’s rising power status helps it to 
achieve its own objectives in the face of the coun-
tervailing interests of the established powers.
Central to Brazil’s claim to represent developing 
countries is its criticism of the existing international 
order for not taking into account the interests and 
wishes of the broader global community. Brazil’s 
former Foreign Minister antonio Patriota captures 
this view succinctly, stating that “the G-20 and oth-
er restricted groupings will only succeed in consol-
idating their authority if they remain sensitive to 
the ambitions and interests of the over 150 coun-
tries who are not present at the meetings.”61 Brazil 
has based its critique of instruments such as the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and privileges such as per-
manent member status in the U.N. security Council 
for the P5 on the argument that they embody in in-
ternational law a tiered system of states. essentially, 
Brazil’s soft power of attraction vis-à-vis the devel-
oping world is not simply cultural or economic, it is 
the promise that its rhetoric about more democrat-
ic, equitable and universal international institutions 
will endure once it becomes a major power.
There is also a danger in Brazil’s claim to simulta-
neously be an emerging power and a leader of the 
less-developed countries. This is a muddled message 
because each claim is based on a different premise. 
as a BriCs country, Brazil is making the claim that 
it is part of an exclusive group of states whose power 
is such that they should be counted as rule shapers 
in the international order alongside the traditional 
powers. as a leader of the developing world, Brazil 
is making the claim that the world order as a whole 
should be more equitable to give all states a greater 
role in shaping the rules. These two claims are not 
compatible.
58  sean W. Burges, “strategies and Tactics for Global Change: Democratic Brazil in Comparative Perspective,” Global Society 26, no. 3 (July 2012): 
351–368, doi:10.1080/13600826.2012.682272.
59  antto Vihma, Yacob Mulugetta, and sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, “Negotiating solidarity? The G77 through the Prism of Climate Change 
Negotiations,” Global Change, Peace & Security 23, no. 3 (October 2011): 315–334, doi:10.1080/14781158.2011.601853; alex Morales, “Us, eU, 
reject Brazilian Call for Climate equity Metric,” Bloomberg News, November 14, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/u-s-eu-
reject-brazilian-call-for-climate-equity-metric.html.
60  stephanie Kage, New Powers for Global Change: Brazil at the UN, Fes Fact sheet, Dialogue on Globalization (New York, NY: Friedrich ebert 
Foundation, October 2006); Jillian Clare Cohen and Kristina M. lybecker, “aiDs Policy and Pharmaceutical Patents: Brazil’s strategy to safe-
guard Public Health,” The World Economy 28, no. 2 (2005): 211–230. 
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brazil’s ConTeMPorary 
roles in global governanCe
Brazil has worked strategically to take advan-tage of the present opportunity structure, but 
the real test of its ability to act as a major power 
lies in its contributions to shaping and enforcing 
the rules that govern the international order. This 
next section examines three cases in which Bra-
zil has participated alongside the major powers in 
devising the rules and regimes that organize the 
international system: the global financial crisis, 
the global response to climate change, and inter-
national responses to imminent threats to human 
security. Consistently, Brazil has privileged the use 
of diplomacy over all other state capabilities. This 
is an effort to play to Brazil’s strengths and avoid 
its relatively limited capacity to contribute to se-
curity outcomes. Though Brazil has succeeded in 
ensuring its participation in major power debates 
on global governance, its reluctance to assume 
economic and military costs frequently prevent it 
from effectively shaping the solutions. Moreover, 
its desire to minimize the role of security concern 
sometimes leads it to propose solutions that are 
discarded as unrealistic by the established powers. 
The global financial crisis in 2008 provided Brazil 
with an unprecedented opportunity to insert itself 
into the heart of international economic and finan-
cial governance. The collapse of lehman Brothers 
in september 2008, the coordinated efforts by the 
world’s central banks to lower interest rates, and 
the massive bailout plans necessary were just a few 
indicators of the seriousness of the crisis for ad-
vanced economies. The financial difficulties faced 
by the developed world were a stark contrast to the 
relative macroeconomic stability of Brazil, india 
and China, all of which rode out the crisis with rel-
atively little trouble. such stability provided Brazil 
with moral high ground during the crisis. The G8 
(a traditional venue for coordination among the 
major powers) faded to the background with the 
rise of the G-20—the broader group of economy 
and Finance Ministers that included both the rising 
and traditional powers—which became the main 
avenue for responding to the crisis. The rising pow-
ers garnered even more importance once reform 
and recapitalization of the iMF became necessary, 
and traditional powers turned to Brazil, india, and 
China for support. in this reform process, Brazil 
worked with india and China to secure a larger 
voice and a larger share of the vote on the institu-
tion’s operations. Brazil was the most vocal critic 
in the G-20 of the rules for global economic gov-
ernance that preceded the crisis, and its critiques 
reflected its historical advocacy for more equitable 
and universal international institutions. The iMF 
under Dominique strauss-Kahn moved to adopt a 
broader view of acceptable development strategies 
that made the institution, at least rhetorically, more 
aligned to Brazil’s own views on the issue. Brazil’s 
role as a key participant in the small group of states 
that coordinate international economic policy in-
dicates that it has joined an exclusive group of ma-
jor powers, at least in the financial domain. This is 
quite a contrast to Brazil’s acceptance of iMF rules 
and conditions during the 1980s latin american 
debt crisis. However, Brazil’s advocacy for univer-
sal and equitable institutions, even in the midst of 
crisis, reflected the contradictions inherent in its 
approach to international relations, simultaneously 
seeking access to exclusive rule-making clubs and 
acting as representative of developing countries.62 
62  andrew F. Cooper, “The G20 as an improvised Crisis Committee and/or a Contested ‘steering Committee’ for the World,” International Affairs 
86, no. 3 (2010): 741–757; Ngaire Woods, “Global Governance after the Financial Crisis: a New Multilateralism or the last Gasp of the Great 
Powers?” Global Policy 1, no. 1 (2010): 51–63.
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Global climate change negotiations showcase an-
other example of Brazil’s transition from the tar-
get of international rules and norms to one of the 
key rule-writing states. Brazil’s rapid development 
brought about significant environmental degrada-
tion, and it was criticized for its role in amazonian 
deforestation during the 1970s and 1980s. Brazil 
responded by becoming a major player in interna-
tional environmental policy discussions so that it 
could better counter this criticism and protect its 
development interests, going so far as to host the 
key U.N. Conference on environment and Devel-
opment in rio de Janeiro in 1992. several com-
peting dynamics are at play in this discussion: the 
urgency of developing and implementing plans to 
reverse, mitigate or adapt to climate change; the 
developing world’s claim that developed coun-
tries should assume the historical responsibility 
for generating climate change; and the developed 
world’s counter arguments that emerging pow-
ers such as Brazil, india, and China are no longer 
developing countries and should assume the re-
sponsibilities (and costs) of being major powers 
with large economies. since most prescriptions 
for addressing climate change have distributional 
consequences through their limits on growth, the 
rising powers have a major interest in ensuring 
that the established powers assume most of the 
costs. in this, they are echoed by the developing 
world which is also unwilling to assume a pro-
portional share of costs. importantly, the climate 
change debate involves a global commons, mean-
ing that the developed world is unable to achieve 
policy success without addressing the positions of 
countries such as Brazil. While Brazil was able to 
successfully mobilize G-77 and BasiC support 
for its positions at Copenhagen, it was only able 
to block the proposal of the developed countries 
but not to secure its own preferences. Brazil then 
hosted the ‘rio+20’ conference in 2012, which was 
designed to both commemorate the original 1992 
rio conference and continue the process of inter-
national negotiations on global climate change. 
The conference was successful in attracting nearly 
40,000 participants, and this event continued in-
tergovernmental negotiations on climate change 
while also hosting a large number of non-govern-
mental actors working in this issue area. Brazil 
considers rio+20 to be a success, not only be-
cause it showcased Brazil’s preference for multi-
lateralism, but was also inclusive of a large range 
of non-governmental actors. Brazil’s successful 
formulation of a compromise outcome document 
that was accepted by the participants affirmed the 
strength of its diplomacy. still, rio+20 was not 
considered particularly successful in producing 
meaningful commitments by the participants to 
actions that would be consequential for global cli-
mate change. in the future, diversity among de-
veloping countries on this issue and the evolution 
of Brazil’s own position on climate change based 
on the ‘greening’ of domestic politics, will make 
it increasingly difficult for Brazil to position itself 
as a bridge between the developed and developing 
world on this issue.63
Brazil has been less successful in asserting its role 
as a major power in responding to international se-
curity crises, where its reluctance to use hard pow-
er leads it to propose solutions that are sometimes 
63  andrew Hurrell and sandeep sengupta, “emerging Powers, North–south relations and Global Climate Politics,” International Affairs 88, no. 3 
(2012): 463–484; James Van alstine, stavros afionis, and Peter Doran, The UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20): A sign of the 
times or “ecology as Spectacle”?, sri Papers (leeds, United Kingdom: sustainability research institute, august 2012).
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rejected as unhelpful or unrealistic by the estab-
lished major powers. Brazil is frequently critical 
of the selectivity with which international law is 
applied by the major powers, especially in cases 
where the international community intervenes in 
the internal affairs of states. Brazil’s stance runs 
counter to the prevailing liberal international or-
der, which is willing to set aside sovereignty and 
use force to pursue humanitarian goals or contain 
rogue states. When Brazil has proposed alterna-
tives, it has not succeeded in securing the support 
of the major powers. 
Two recent cases illustrate this dynamic: the Bra-
zil-Turkey-iran nuclear deal, and Brazil’s role in 
the U.N. security Council during and after the 
intervention in libya. in 2010, Brazil and Turkey 
brokered an agreement that would have allowed 
iran to exchange enriched uranium for fuel for 
a medical reactor. Through this proposal, Brazil 
hoped to protect its own commercial interests vis-
à-vis iran as well as the general principle that states 
have a right to peaceful nuclear development. Bra-
zil hoped the proposal would resolve the crisis 
since the deal had been brokered in line with the 
elements of an earlier nuclear fuel swap proposed 
in 2009 by the United states. Western powers re-
jected the proposal because of their concerns over 
iran’s intentions and potential for military use of 
nuclear power, including future enrichment of 
uranium; the United states proceeded to impose 
new sanctions.64 The rejection of the Brazilian and 
Turkish proposal came as a blow to President lula 
da silva’s hope that this deal would showcase Bra-
zil’s unique ability to convene opposing parties and 
further justify its participation in major power de-
bates over international security.
Brazil’s ambition was that its participation on the 
U.N. security Council during the 2011-2012 term 
would further its case for a permanent seat in this 
body and thus a permanent role in shaping inter-
national security.65 instead, the term highlighted 
the tensions between Brazil’s views of internation-
al politics and those of the West. Brazil’s decision 
to caucus with BriC countries during its term in 
the UNsC was not viewed positively by the West-
ern members of the Council. The U.N. response 
to the conflict in libya in 2011 led to a further 
split between Brazil and the West when the ini-
tial authorization to intervene was used by NaTO 
to justify an expanded campaign against a broad 
range of government targets in libya, leading to 
the fall of Colonel Gaddafi. The expansion of the 
intervening powers’ objectives provoked criticism 
from the BriCs and developing countries that re-
sponsibility to Protect (r2P) was being used as a 
cover for regime change. in her 2011 speech to the 
U.N. General assembly, President Dilma rousseff 
instead put forward the concept of responsibility 
while Protecting (rWP), advocating that states us-
ing force to protect civilians in humanitarian and 
human rights crises carefully consider the damage 
they inadvertently cause. rWP has been rejected 
by the United states and many european states as 
unrealistic, but it highlighted ongoing disagree-
ment between Brazil and the West over norms 
governing the use of force in response to humani-
tarian crises. This issue became salient once again 
during the syria crisis, in which the european 
64  Carlo Patti, “Brazil and the Nuclear issues in the Years of the luiz inácio lula Da silva Government (2003-2010),” Revista Brasileira de Política 
Internacional 53, no. 2 (2010): 178–195.
65  Permanent membership is an ambition Brazil shares with Germany, india and Japan (known at the G-4). They have collaborated on U.N. secu-
rity Council reform for over a decade. amado luiz Cervo, “Brazil’s rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World,” Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional 53, no. sPe (2010): 7–32. 
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states initially split from the United states over the 
use of force.66 Brazil’s use of its prominent role in 
UNsC allowed it to insert itself into core debates 
among the major powers, but it was not able to 
shape the rules governing the use of force in the 
international system. 
This is by no means an exhaustive catalog of how 
Brazil has used its status as a rising power to be-
come a central actor in global debates on public 
health, human rights, social inclusion, and devel-
opment. rather, these examples have highlighted 
Brazil’s willingness to participate in the shaping of 
the rules governing the global order, and the chal-
lenge major powers face when they include Brazil 
in their deliberations. However, participation does 
not necessarily translate into effective rule-mak-
ing, as seen in the failure to adopt rWP or to ef-
fectively address climate change. Brazil’s power is 
based on its ability to generate friction and inflict 
diplomatic costs in multilateral forums, but this 
does not extend into the shaping and maintaining 
of the contemporary order.
66  alcides Costa Vaz, Brazilian Perspectives on the Changing Global Order and Security Challenges, CePs Working Document (Brussels: Centre for 
european Policy studies (CePs), February 2013).
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THe liMiTs on brazil’s rise: 
ConClusions and PoliCy 
reCoMMendaTions
Brazil’s leaders have some difficult decisions ahead in 2014 and 2015.  Brazil needs to im-
plement an economic adjustment plan to address 
its overvalued currency, persistent inflation, high 
levels of consumer debt, and slowing econom-
ic growth. Brazil’s prospects in the energy sector, 
particularly the offshore oil field known as the pre-
sal are not as bright as they once seemed. Finally, 
the Brazilian middle class will continue to demand 
improved government effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability.
None of these issues present an insurmountable 
obstacle to Brazil’s rise, or even reflect a long term 
threat to Brazil’s success. Brazil has an unprece-
dented set of opportunities to rise: a large econo-
my, considerable soft power, lack of regional rivals, 
and a network of partners among other rising pow-
ers and the developing world. Brazil has become 
an important player on the world stage, but thus 
far its rise is constrained by an incomplete range 
of hard and soft power tools necessary to become 
consequential in and for the international order. 
its participation in global governance during its 
current attempt to rise is undercut by its reluctance 
to assume the costs—military or economic—that 
are required for shaping and maintaining, let alone 
revising, the present international order.
Brazil can take four steps to remedy the shortcom-
ings that its recent participation in global gover-
nance has revealed while still maintaining its com-
mitment to the norms that have historically guided 
its foreign policy. Brazil’s shortage of military hard 
power is likely to be enduring since its regional se-
curity environment is—and is likely to remain—
peaceful. This means Brazil lacks one of the main 
tools used by other major powers to participate in 
international order making. However, given that in-
terstate conflict is not a major threat to Brazil and 
that global or systemic conflict is improbable, its 
government is right not to emphasize this dimen-
sion in its rise. rather, Brazil should improve its 
contributions to international peacekeeping. The 
first step should be to extend the geographic scope 
of its peacekeeping contributions beyond the amer-
icas, africa, and the Portuguese-speaking world in 
keeping with its status as an aspiring global power. 
Brazil should also focus on developing the types of 
capabilities that are in short supply among peace-
keeping contributing nations: intelligence, logistics, 
aviation, communications, command, and control. 
Building on its experiences in Haiti, Brazil should 
commit to develop the capability to deploy military 
units that have additional staff and support capacity 
to form the nucleus of a large peacekeeping force 
that incorporates contingents from other states. 
This is in keeping with the contributions of other 
major powers to international peacekeeping. By de-
veloping these capabilities that are in short supply, 
Brazil would acquire greater influence on the terms 
under which its peacekeepers deploy and their ob-
jectives while on the ground, giving it another ave-
nue by which to shape the international order. 
The second area where Brazil can achieve greater 
influence is by extending the reach of its humani-
tarian and development assistance to a global scale. 
Brazil currently ranks 23rd among international 
donors of humanitarian assistance.67 Major powers 
67  “speak softly and Carry a Blank Check,” The Economist, July 15, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16592455; Global Humanitarian assis-
tance, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013 (Bristol, UK: Development initiatives, 2013).
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use contributions to international institutions and 
direct aid to create incentives for small and mid-
dle powers to accept their preferred international 
order. Brazil’s overseas development assistance has 
risen in the past decade. Nevertheless, possessing 
the seventh largest economy in the world means 
that Brazil should be able to increase its contribu-
tions in this area over the long term above the 0.2 
percent of gross national income that it contrib-
uted in 2011. Brazil has extensive domestic expe-
rience in designing social programs designed to 
reduce poverty and build state capacity as part of 
its internal development agenda. it is already using 
this knowledge and technology in its international 
assistance programs in the americas and parts of 
africa. Brazil can readily increase its contributions 
to global governance simply by extending the geo-
graphic scope, increasing the budget it commits 
to these programs, and raising the visibility of its 
development strategy. such use of its development 
assistance to promote poverty reduction and social 
inclusion would have a positive impact on global 
development and contribute to its own status and 
to its soft power.
Thirdly, Brazil should reconsider its strategy to 
secure its ‘near abroad’ by proliferating multilat-
eral institutions. although Brazil has been able to 
avoid the rise of regional challengers, it has not 
been able to persuade other latin american pow-
ers such as argentina and Mexico to back its rise. 
Brazil has been reluctant to endow new interna-
tional institutional arrangements with resources 
or powers that might limit Brazil’s own freedom of 
action, but this means they do not limit any other 
state’s actions as well. Defections and rule bending 
by member states do little for the credibility of in-
stitutions Brazil creates. Brazil would therefore do 
well to endow a few key regional institutions with 
more binding rules, greater capacity and stronger 
incentives for other states in latin america to par-
ticipate. Brazil should then commit to these abid-
ing by these rules. Not only would this give Brazil 
improved mechanisms for building regional sup-
port for its preferred policies, but it would signal 
to states such as Mexico and argentina that Brazil’s 
rise is not a threat as it is bound by a shared set 
of institutional arrangements and commitments to 
the region. 
Finally, Brazil should identify additional issues on 
which it takes a collaborative approach in interna-
tional forums vis-à-vis the established powers. Bra-
zil has been generally successful and skillful in its 
deployment of soft power to attract support from 
the developing world and other rising powers. Bra-
zil’s domestic achievements present an attractive 
narrative for major power democracies such as 
the United states. However, in the absence of hard 
power, attracting the support of established pow-
ers for Brazil’s rise requires a collaborative agenda 
that gives major powers a stake in Brazil’s success. 
Brazil’s repeated criticism of the U.s.-led liberal in-
ternational order negates its ability to deploy soft 
power in its relationship with the West. its reliance 
on a coalition that includes authoritarian regimes – 
the BriCs—and is also frequently critical of liberal 
international objectives has led the leading pow-
ers to label Brazil as difficult to work with. While 
Brazilian diplomats may see their stands on sover-
eignty, non-intervention and international law as 
principled, Brazil may consequently only get a seat 
at the table but not a role in the rule-shaping. For 
example, as the world moves into an era of mega 
trade deals, such as the Transatlantic Trade and 
investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship, Brazil has so far been excluded. This suggests 
that Brazil needs to pick and choose with care what 
policies it attempts to block and present positive 
and realistic alternatives when it does not agree 
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with the policies advocated by the established 
powers. This would begin to erase Brazil’s repu-
tation for obstructionism among Western powers 
and further build the case for its inclusion in shap-
ing the international order.
There are two important and related questions that 
U.s. policymakers should consider:  is Brazil likely 
to change its ideas about the international order 
sufficiently so that the two countries will expand 
common ground on which to work together? 
should the United states encourage Brazil to more 
fully develop its military and economic capabil-
ities so that it can contribute more effectively to 
global order?
The answer to the first question may depend as 
much on the evolving role of domestic politics in 
shaping Brazil’s foreign policy as on conversations 
among diplomats. Brazil’s foreign policy is begin-
ning to democratize in the sense that influence is 
held by a wider array of voices than traditional 
elites. Brazilians’ core values of democracy, equal-
ity, inclusion, development and human rights are 
fully compatible with the existing international 
order on many dimensions. as Brazil’s democracy 
further evolves and deepens, its government may 
face increasingly direct questions about its reluc-
tance to support democracy and human rights in 
illiberal or authoritarian regimes. This may force 
a more realistic assessment of the policies Bra-
zil proposes and may lead Brazil to re-examine 
the appropriate balance between supporting the 
non-intervention norm and supporting democra-
cy and human rights abroad. 
The United states should also consider the shadow 
of the future.68 as this paper documents, Brazil’s 
aspirations and trajectory have been clear for some 
time. attempting to block Brazil’s rise would only 
increase the distance between the United states 
and one of the few rising powers whose citizens 
share many of the same values as U.s. citizens. 
On the other hand, if the U.s. bets on cooperating 
with Brazil as it becomes a major power, then it 
is in the United states’ best interest to encourage 
Brazil to commit more fully to developing its ca-
pabilities to support global order, much as the Us 
has done with allies in europe and Northeast asia. 
The United states has considerable knowledge on 
how to structure effective development assistance. 
it also has experience in providing support to 
multinational military coalitions, which although 
different in their objective than peacekeeping mis-
sions, require some of the same capabilities in the 
area of logistics, intelligence, communications, 
and mobility.
Brazil faces important choices about the future 
at this stage in its rise. it is still highly ambivalent 
towards the deployment of hard power. Brazil’s 
society still largely perceives itself as living in a 
developing country that has persistent social ills, 
unaccountable politics and fragile economic foun-
dations on which to build its emerging middle 
class. Targeting resources to foreign policy, peace-
keeping, and international assistance is a hard sell 
for Brazilian diplomats and politicians. However, 
the alternative is for Brazil to fall short in its rise, 
unable to effectively shape the global order in a 
way that protects its interests, benefits its citizens, 
and fulfills its aspirations.
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